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It is typical (even among many of the most zealous 
advocates of humane treatment of animals) for people to 
assume that the only moral issue regarding our treatment 
of animals lies in our needlessly slaughtering them or 
causing them pain. Thus, people rightly complain about 
our causing the extinction of a certain species or of 
those who cruelly beat their pets. We, however, have 
come to think that this common attitude is too restric-
tive and that there is another fundamental moral issue 
raised by our treatment of other animals. Namely, do 
we have the right—and if so, to what extent—to restrict 
the liberty of other animals? This paper represents our 
attempt, first, to show that this is a genuine moral 
issue and, second, to give a preliminary indication of 
the problems facing us if we presume a general license 
to restrict animals* freedom. 
In order to accomplish this, we have constructed an 
imaginary dialogue between two fairly rational.human 
beings: Amos who presumes that we do have such a general 
license and Andy who argues that we do not. Since the 
particular moral questions which may arise under the 
rubric of animals' rights to freedom are complex and 
varied (e.g., consider the difference between restricting 
the liberty of domestic, as opposed to wild, animals), 
there is a need, for the purposes of clarity and sim-
plicity, to restrict the scope of the questions covered. 
In this way, we may better focus our attention on the 
general issues raised by our treatment of animals, con-
sequently, the dialogue concentrates primarily on the 
question: Do we have the right to place animals, es-
pecially wild animals, in zoos? 
It is presumed that the usual justification for our 
restricting animals' freedom lies in our attitude about 
the differences between humans and animals, i.e., that 
there is such a radical or significant difference be-
tween ourselves and animals that we have no .reason to 
concern ourselves with their liberty or the lack of it. 
The basis for this attitude is relected in theology, 
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as well as in the writing of such philosophers as Aris-
totle and Descartes. Much of our dialogue is devoted 
to an examination of this alleged "type difference1* be-
tween humans and animals. Our purpose is, first, to 
discover whether there is such a difference and, second, 
to evaluate what significance such differences have for 
the moral question before us. The concept of "super-
human" beings, i.e., here extraterrestrials who are far 
superior to us in various ways, is introduced in order 
to shed light on the warrant for our attitudes about 
other animals. Among other questions raised, one 
stands out: Can we fairly or non-arbitrarily justify 
our restricting animals' freedom such that our justi-
fication would not also justify superhumans restricting 
our freedom in similar ways? 
(Setting: Two friends, Amos and Andy, meandering 
through a local zoo.) 
Amos: Andy, look at that lion cowering in the back of 
his cage. He doesn't look so terrifying to me. And 
to think they call him "the king of the jungleI" 
Andy: You wouldn't be so brave if he were not caged in 
this way. 
Amos: Quite so, Andy. That is precisely why he belongs 
in that cage. 
Andy (indignantly): Yes, I supposed you would say some-
thing like that. I, however, couldn't disagree more, 
fie should be running free in the wilds of his natural 
habitat. What right do we have to place him in captivity? 
Amos: Oh, come now, Andy! 
Andy: Yes, and what's more, I suppose my point applies 
to all the animals we lock up in our zoos. 
Amos: Well, leave it to you to be urging outrageous 
points of view I What harm do we do these dumb animals 
by putting them in zoos? Surely, you don't want to say 
that animals have the same rights as human beings, or 
that they are entitled to the freedom which we afford 
ourselves? 
Andy: Ho, not the same rights, but I do think it is 
wrong for them to be put in zoos and cages. After all, 
suppose some beings much more advanced than humans came 
to Earth and treated us the way we treat animals. Can 
you imagine the consequences? 
Amos: I'm not sure I follow you here. Your conjuring 
up Martians has taken me by surprise. Of course, there 
would be the obvious consequence that humans would be 
treated as we treat animals. Surely, you hope to draw 
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my atbention to more than thisI 
Andy: Indeed, ray friend. We are unduly unkind to 
animals in a host of ways. We hunt them for sport and 
for restricting their population growth; we force them 
to do menial labor; we keep them as housepets. In ex-
treme cases, we kill them simply because they annoy us. 
Amos: You mean like drowning a litter of kittens? 
Andy: Exactly. 
Amos: Perhaps I begin to see your point. I would be 
the last to deny that we sometimes treat animals wrongly 
though I don't agree with you about all the cases you 
cite as abuses. Why, for example, is it wrong for us 
to put animals in zoos? 
Andy: Well, this is why I mentioned the case of extra-
terrestrials visiting the Earth. Suppose they put us 
in zoos. Even if they, then, treated us very kindly, it 
would still be wrong. If we can justify our treatment 
of animals by virtue of our superiority over them, the 
extraterrestrials could justify their treatment of us by 
virtue of their superiority over us. 
Amos: I see. So you imagine that the case of your 
little green men is on all fours with the ways we typica 
ly treat animals. This, however, does not seem true. I 
grant you that it would be wrong for your Martians to 
make us their pets, put us in zoos, hunt us for sport, 
etc. Neither do I think it would be right for them to 
treat us so because they are far more intelligent or 
technologically advanced than we. Similarly, I would 
not say that we are justified in treating animals as 
we do on the basis that we are more intelligent than 
they. We are not involved here with a matter of degree, 
but of quality or type. It is because humans are the 
sorts of things they are that they cannot be treated 
as housepets, encaged in zoos, etc. Because animals 
are not the sort of creatures which we are, they do not 
have the same rights as we. Similarly, it is because 
humans are this sort of creature that Martians would not 
be entitled to treat us as we treat dumb animals. 
Andy: You correctly understand my analogy between the 
way humans treat animals and the way the extraterrestri-
als might treat humans. However, the force of the 
analogy may be preserved without my saying that the two 
superiorities, i.e., of humans over animals and of 
extraterrestrials over humans, are merely a matter of 
degree and nob a sharp difference in kind. Evidently, 
you want to hold that the superiority of humans over 
animals is not a matter of degree at all. Apparently, 
you assume that there are characteristics which all 
humans have and which animals do not, e.g., characteris-
tics of intelligence and emotion. Therefore, to pre-
serve the strength of my analogy, let us imagine that my 
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extraterrestrials have not only all the intellectual 
and emotional characteristics of humans (and then some) , 
but also have an extra-added ingredient—let's call it 
'fluoristan'—which makes them ultra-superior to humans. 
The superiority is, then, a superiority of kind, not 
merely of degree. So, by your own reasoning, it seems 
tiie extraterrestrials would have the right to lord it 
over us after all. 
Amos: I suppose I did suggest, though X don't want to 
now that I think about it, that the difference between 
humans and animals is not a matter of degree. Doubtless, 
there are many ways in which animals may be compared 
with us according to the degree we possess some character-
istic. For example, humans may be more versatile com-
municators than other animals, or animals may be less 
inhibited than we are. The point is not that there 
aren't differences of degree between Kuraans and animals, 
but that there is a type difference which is crucial. 
Furthermore, it is not the mere fact that there is some 
or another type difference between us that makes a 
difference here. Even if it is true that humans have a 
certain "kind" of chromosome structure which animals do 
not, this is of no significance to the point X am making. 
Similarly, the mere fact that your Martians have the 
added ingredient "fluoristan" does not give them special 
privileges from a moral point of view. It is the 
particular kind of qualitative difference which is 
crucial. Unless "fluoristan" is a morally relevant 
characteristic, your Martians would have no special 
rights. Human beings are self-conscious creatures with 
a desire for their freedom and dignity. Presumably, 
this would also be true of your little green men. As 
such creatures, let us call them "persons," they deserve 
certain considerations which animals do not. For 
example, it is not appropriate to hunt persons for sport, 
force them into slave-like labor, put them in zoos, or 
keep them as housepets. 
Andy: Evidently, you grant that fluoristan might be a 
morally relevant ingredient. Aren't you thereby granting 
that the extraterrestrials might indeed have something 
about them which would entitle them to lord it over us? 
I don't mean to entangle us in theological disputes, but 
on your view, if God existed, he would presumably have 
something about him which entitled him to lord it over 
us—even to the extent, say, of restricting our freedom 
or controlling our population growth for our own good. 
Thus, his perspective on our situation, sub specie 
aetemitatis, might put him in a better position to 
solve our problems than we are in. The extraterrestrials 
we have hypothesized are not gods, but perhaps their 
superhuman perspective would justify their taking a very 
paternalistic stance towards humans (if our human per-
spective justifies us in being paternalistic towards 
animals. 
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Amos: True, the mysterious feature "fluoristan" might 
be a morally relevant characteristic. Without knowing 
anything about it, save that it is a "super-added 
ingredient," I am unable to judge whether it would, in 
fact, be of moral salience. Unless it does something . 
more for your Martians than make their teeth sparkle, I 
rather doubt that we should take it seriously. Now, 
it is doubtless true that God, if God exists, would be 
entitled to certain things which neither we nor your 
Martians would be entitled (e.g., our undying reverence 
or awe). God would, however, be bound by moral re-
strictions as much—indeed, far more so—as any other 
person. Just because God is a Being who is all-knowing^ 
and all-mighty does not mean that God, thereby, has the 
right to deny people their dignity or liberty. If God 
has rights which we do not, it is primarily because God 
is perfectly good and for no other reason. Thus, if God 
ever has the right to solve our problems for us (as He 
sees fit), it is because He knows with certainty what is 
the right thing to do and not because He has some or 
another "super-added ingredient," e.g., omnipotence. 
Paternalism on anyone's part requires justification, 
and so far as I can see, you have given no reason why 
your little green men's having fluoristan provides them 
with such justification. 
Andy: But God's greater power, insight, and mobility 
would make him better at being good than any human. If 
fluoristan made the extraterrestrials better at being 
good than any human, it would seem to follow on your 
view that the extraterrestrials would be justified in 
lording it over us humans. 
Amos: No, not at all. That someone is "better at being 
good," as you put it, than another does not entitle him 
(with the exception of God, in virute of His perfection) 
to restrict the liberty of those he is better than. If 
I were far wiser than you in every respect, this would 
not entitle ma to force you to avoid making what I was 
certain was a mistake on your part, e.g., marrying a 
certain woman. Neither would your Martians be entitled 
to place us in zoos, make us pets, etc. simply because 
they were convinced we would be better off in such cir-
cumstances. 
Andy: I sympathize with your anti-paternalistic atti-
tude. It seems to me, however, suspiciously selective. 
That is, you accept human paternalism over animals, 
don't you? 
Amos: Well, I do think paternalism towards animals if 
often justified. This, however, is not my main point. 
The point is that we have certain features, e.g., self-
consciousness and a sense of dignity, which afford us 
rights of liberty that neither God nor Martians would 
be entitled to infringe upon. Presumably, these rights 
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would also extend to Martians qua persons. On the other 
hand, animals do not have these features and, hence, are 
not entitled to remain free from being put in zoos. 
Andy: Are you suggesting that because animals have no 
self-awareness or sense of dignity, it follows that humans 
are entitled to place animals in zoos? 
Amos: Indeed I am, though I do not, of course, mean to 
imply that we are entitled to treat animals in any old 
fashion while they are in zoos. 
Andy: What if placing animals in zoos made humans 
miserable, quite independently of its effect on animals? 
Would you still infer that humans have the right to place 
animals in zoos? 
Amos: I'm not quite sure about this odd case. I sup-
pose I would say that, at least, where most humans were 
deeply hurt or offended by this, we would not have the 
right to put animals in zoos. 
Andy: Then, the supposition that animals lack self-
consciousness and dignity does not, by itself, suffice 
to give humans the right to place animals in zoos. After 
all, it would also have to be supposed that most humans 
were not thereby made miserable. Is this not so? 
Amos: Yes, I suppose it is. But tell me, what does 
this show about our right, in general, to restrict the 
liberty of animals, as well as what your Martians might 
have the right to do to us? As far as I can see, this 
point sheds little light on these matters and does 
little, if anything, to show that we are not entitled 
under present circumstances to place animals in zoos. 
Andy: I shall try to explain. Since the supposition 
that animals lack self-consciousness and a sense of 
dignity needs to be supplemented by the further assump-
tion that humans are not deeply hurt by putting animals 
into zoos, haven't we realized that factors of human 
welfare may deprive us of the right to place animals in 
zoos? 
Amos: Yes. 
Andy: Since human welfare is just an instance of the 
general welfare (after all, the needs and interests of 
the extraterrestrials we have hypothesized would, qua 
being personal needs and interests, need to be consider-
ed as part of the general welfare), may we not generalize 
on this point and say that humans have no right to 
place animals in zoos without the assurance that the 
general welfare will not thereby be diminished? Or is 
there something vicious in assuming that it is the general 
welfare which is crucial to moral concerns and that the 
general welfare is, at least, not necessarily the same 
as the general human welfare? 
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Amos: No, though your point strikes me as peculiar, I 
see nothing vicious in your generalization. Now, once 
again, will you please tell me where this is leading us. 
I have granted you that where the general welfare would 
be harmed by our restricting the liberty of animals, we 
should not so restrict their freedom. But, how is it 
that we harm, in realistic terms, the general welfare 
by placing animals in zoos? Surely, you don't imagine 
that we do any grievous harm to animals by treating 
them thuslyl After all, it is only self-conscious 
creatures who possess a sense of dignity that are en-
titled to remain free from such confinement and, in 
general, from suffering like indignities. Because of 
this, you Martians would do us serious harm by sub-
jecting us to such treatment. Yet, it seems, since 
animals have no such rights, we do them no similar 
harm by treating them in such ways. 
Andy: But I do imagine that we harm animals by placing 
them in zoos." Animals do not desire to be placed in 
such captivity, as is clear from the universal efforts 
of wild animals to resist being captured. Why do you 
think zoos occasionally have such great difficulty in 
getting their animals to mate? Zoo keepers are often 
keenly aware of the upsetting and disorienting effect 
suffered by animals in captivity. Clearly, insofar as 
we have the ability to make animals suffer, we have the 
ability to affect their welfare. You try to escape from 
taking this seriously by insisting that since animals 
lade self-consciousness and a sense of dignity, they 
have no right to remain out of zoos. But consider this. 
Is it only self-consciousness and a sense of dignity 
which entitles us, or any other creature, to be not held 
captive in a zoo? Or, are there other circumstances 
which yield such rights? 
Amos: I believe I have already answered you on this point. 
Andy: Well, I am not sure you have answered this so 
much as you have simply affirmed the view that having 
such features is a necessary condition of a creature's 
having such a right. Consider this. Suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that the mere fact that a being were 
placed in a zoo caused it continual and excruciating 
agony. Furthermore, suppose that this creature had 
done nothing immoral and were in no way a threat to the 
well-being of other creatures. Would it not be wrong to 
place such a creature in a zoo, and is not this just one 
way of saying that, under such circumstances, the crea-
ture would have the right to remain out of the zoo? 
Amos: Yes, I suppose so, but this case is too bizarre 
to have bearing on the bone of contention between us. 
Andy: Be patient with roe. Though this case is unusual, 
I assure you it is relevant to our discussion. If what 
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we have granted about this case is correct, then it is 
correct whether or not the creature is self-conscious 
or has a sense of dignity. And if this is so, then, 
there are other circumstances than a being's having 
self-awareness or sense of dignity which can give it 
the right not to be placed in a zoo. Consequently, we 
see, do we not, that self-consciousness and a sense of 
dignity are not essential to a creature's having the 
right to liberites usually associated only with humans 
or persons? 
Amos: Well, this would seem to be so. Still, something 
about this reasoning troubles me. 
Andy: Since you are not firmly convinced on this point, 
let us approach this general issue from a somewhat differ-
ent direction. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, 
that animals do not have exactly the same right as humans 
to remain free from such confinement. Indeed, let us 
suppose that they have no such right at all (in the full-
blooded sense of "rights" normally associated with human 
affairs). Nevertheless, this does not mean that we have 
the right to put animals in zoos. After all, we may be 
very poor zoo keepers. Likewise, I may not have the 
right to remain unimprisoned, but this does not mean 
that anyone else whatsoever has the right to imprison me. 
Amos: What! This "subtlety" sounds unintelligible to 
me. 
Andy: Then consider the following as an example of ray 
meaning. Suppose I have committed some crime which 
merits my serving some time in jail. This does not imply 
that the Marquis de Sade has the right to put me in jail. 
Aside from the obvious hypocrisy of his doing so, he 
would be unsuited on both moral and other grounds to do 
this to me. Even if one needs to be self-aware and 
"dignified" to have the right to certain liberties, this 
example shows that this prerequisite does not imply that 
others are entitled to deprive one of those liberties 
(on the basis that one lacks the necessary features). 
And, after all, haying self-awareness and a sense of 
dignity does not, in itself, entitle one to restrict the 
freedom of others. Do you now see my point? 
Amos: I think so. 
Andy: Evidently then, we can no more pronounce holy our 
treatment of animals because they lack self-consciousness 
and a sense of dignity than extraterrestrials could lord 
it over us simply because we lack fluoristan while they 
do not. 
Amos: So it would seem, though I am still convinced 
that we do no wrong by putting animals in zoos. 
Andy: Well then, consider this. Do we ever have the 
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right to cause harm where we can avoid it? Or, to put 
matters a bit differently, is it ever right for us to 
allow such harm (I mean, for example, where causing 
such harm is not the result of something immoral having 
been done)? 
Amos: Would you also have in mind cases where the harm 
caused is done in order to bring about some greater and 
overriding moral end? 
Andy: To be sure, except I would prefer to say instead, 
"where the harm caused actually has, or is likely to 
have, the effect of bringing about some greater and over-
riding moral end" (begging us to recall that the road to 
hell can be paved with good intentions). 
Amos: Then, I think you are right. 
Andy: Thus, on this principle, I suppose that if extra-
terrestrials, who were wiser and more powerful than we 
in virtue of their having fluoristan, discovered that 
humans had become very corrupt and cruel, and thus 
decided to cause each human a slow and agonizing death, 
they would be wrong. Do you agree? 
Amos: Indeed I do. 
Andy: And if, supposing that we were not corrupt or 
cruel, such beings were to decide to place us in zoos 
or make us their pets, they would almost as certainly 
be wrong—since in virtue of our being self-conscious . 
beings with a sense of dignity, harm would be caused 
us that would not be justified by any greater moral end. 
Amos: This would certainly be my view. 
Andy: Mow tell mc this. Do we harm animals by placing 
them in zoos? I do not ask you to judge how grave such 
harm might be, but simply to consider whether animals 
dislike such treatment. 
Amos: Well, perhaps we do cause them some discomfort and anxiety by forcing them into such confinement, but . . . 
Andy (interrupting): Do not lose grip of the point 
before us I Rather fasten yourself upon it tightly, 
lest we lose sight of one matter by pursuing another. 
Animals resist being removed from their native habitats, 
often try to escape from zoos, suffer mating difficulties, 
and often become morose and sickly in captivity. Is 
this nob good reason to think that we do cause animals 
seme harm (and the degree varies) by stripping them of 
their natural liberties and so confining them? 
Amos: Well, I suppose we do cause them harm, at least very often. 
Andy: And what purpose or effect is realized by our 
putting animals in such captivity? Do we put them there 
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because they have been found to be acting immorally? 
Amos: Ha, of course not. Dumb animals are neither moral 
nor immoral creatures. 
Andy: Then, again, I ask you: What purpose is served 
by our putting them in zoos? 
Amos: Well, people are aroused, especially small child-
ren, by seeing the animals. 
Andy: True. Would you say that it is ever right for 
us to cause something harm merely for the sake of our 
amusement? 
Amos: This certainly does not sound like a very noble 
thing to do. I suppose not. 
Andy: Then cur amusement cannot serve as a justification 
of this practice. 
Amos: Apparently not. 
Andy: What other noble purposes are served by our 
so confining animals? 
Amos: Well, there is our own edification. For example, 
we may thereby gain a better appreciation of the animal 
kingdom, thereby benefiting animals in an indirect way. 
Andy: Yes, but we have other ways of being edified 
about animals. May we not read about them, watch Wild 
Kingdom, or perhaps journey to a game preserve? 
Amos: I suppose so. 
Andy: Do we not have a similar choice with regard to 
studying animals scientifically? That is, may the 
scientist not study animals in their natural environ-
ment? 
Amos: Yes, scientists often do this. 
Andy: Then it seems that confining animals to zoos is 
not the only means we have of educating ourselves about 
the animal kingdom. Neither is it the only way we have 
of "appreciating" animals. Dut if this is so, consider 
closely the following question: Do we ever have the 
right to harm something for the purpose of attaining 
some end (perhaps a noble one) if we know there is 
another way to attain that end? For example, is a 
dentist entitled to extract your abscessed tooth with-
out using novacaine if he knows he can do so by using 
the novacaine which he has at his disposal? 
Amos: Are you kidding7 Of course, the dentist should 
choose the less painful means where he has a choice. 
Andy: So you agree to the more general point as well? 
Amos: Yes, it seems sound enough. 
Andy: Very well then, since we have an alternative way 
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to be instructed about animals, as well as to "appreciate" 
them, these ends do not serve to justify our confining 
animals to zoos. Is this not so? 
Amos: Apparently. 
Andy: Well then, we still have found no overriding 
moral end which is served by our placing wild animals 
in zoos. Can you think of any other purpose which is 
served by this practice and which is noble? 
Amos: (thinking for a few moments): No, not at present. 
Andy: I am not surprised that you cannot, for I think, 
you could discover a unicorn as easily. It would appear, 
then, on the principle that we must not cause harm 
where we can avoid it, that we have no right to re-
strict animals' freedom by placing them in zoos. Does 
this not seem to you to be the natural consequence of 
our thinking on this subject? 
Amos: So it would seem 
Andy: And we have also found that animals' lack of self-
consciousness and sense of dignity is not nearly as 
important, morally speaking, as you originally thought 
it was. Simiairly, it seems that our possessing these 
(at least this is normally the case for humans in their 
waking moments) entitles us to much less with regard 
to our treatment of different sorts of creatures than 
it, at first, appeared. And we have found the same sort 
of point to apply to extraterrestrials with their added 
ingredient "fluoristan." Thus, we have discovered that 
a creature's being extraordinary when compared with other 
creatures—even if this extraordinariness involves 
superior power and wisdom—gives it less dominion over 
the other than you had initially thought. Is this not 
the upshot of our discussion? 
Amos: So it seems, though I still cannot help but feel 
that we are not wrong to place animals in zoos and that 
there is a great difference between your little green 
men's tampering with our liberty and our confining 
animals to zoos. However, the proper reasons for these 
two beliefs seem to have eluded me. 
Andy: indeed, my friend. Perhaps another time you will 
succeed in discovering that which has so eluded you here. 
In discussing animal rights, human rights, and 
superhuman rights, we have seen that it is by no means 
clear that if the differences between humans and other 
animals justify our placing animals in zoos, similar 
differences between ourselves and superhumans would not 
also justify their placing us in zoos. Yet, one cannot 
help but feel that it would be wrong for such extra-
terrestrials to treat us in this way. Consequently, it 
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would appear that there is prima facie reason for sus-
pecting that we cannot justify bur "enslaving" of other 
animals on the basis that they are very different than 
we (e.g., that they are inferior sorts of creatures). 
We have also seen that there is a difference between x 
having (or not) the right to _ and someone else y_ 
having <or not) the right to"deny to x. X may not 
have the right to . , yet it nonetheless Be false that 
y_ has the right to""deny to x. Thus, even if other 
animals do not have the right (In any full blown sense) 
to their liberty, it does not follow that we have the 
right to restrict animals' freedom. It has also been 
argued that having self-awareness and a sense of dignity 
is not a necessary condition for a creature's being 
entitled to its normal liberty. Thus, animals' lack of 
self-consciousness and sense of dignity is not sufficient 
reason for us to restrict their freedom. 
Finally, we have considered the general circumstances 
which yield a creature the right to its normal liberty. 
In this regard, we have noted the principle that it is 
appropriate to cause something harm only when doing so 
serves (or is likely to serve) some overriding moral end. 
It has been argued that the right to do another harm is 
contingent upon the question of whether doing so will 
diminish the general welfare (in some suitably generous 
interpretation of "general welfare"). In particular, 
it has been argued that the welfare of animals should 
be considered as an instance of the general welfare and 
that if this is done, it would appear we have no license 
to restrict animals' freedom by confining them in zoos. 
